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BlackCrit Theory and the Problem
of Essentialism
DOROTHY E. ROBERTS*
Some critical scholars might object to a BlackCrit theory, which is
focused on the identities, experiences, and aspirations of Black people,
on the grounds that it is essentialist. BlackCrit theory, it could be
argued, poses the danger of three forms of false universalism that are
characteristic of essentialism.' It could erroneously imply that Blacks
share a common, essential identity; it could erroneously attribute to all
people of color the experiences of Black people; and it could reinforce
the white-black paradigm as the only lens through which to view racial
oppression. In this essay, I will use reproduction as a concrete substan-
tive point of reference to explore the concern that a BlackCrit theory
would be essentialist.
I entitled my first major law review article, which discussed a
reproductive rights issue, "Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies:
Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy."2 In the years
after publishing that article, I have asked myself why I used the words
"women of color" in the title. The article concerns Black women in
particular, not women of color in general. It focuses on the prosecutions
of poor Black women who smoked crack during pregnancy. I think I put
"women of color" in the title because I thought it would be essentialist
to confine my attention to Black women. I was probably reacting to a
criticism that I sometimes heard when I presented the paper before it
was published: "You didn't talk about Latinas," "You didn't talk about
Asian women," or "You didn't talk about Native American women." I
often found these comments distracting because I had not come to talk
about those groups of women although I hoped my presentation was
* Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. This essay is based on a transcription
of my remarks presented during the Moderated Group Discussion, "From RaceCrit to LatCrit to
BlackCrit?: Exploring Critical Race Theory Beyond and Within the Black-White Paradigm," at
the LatCritlIl Symposium, May 1998. I am grateful to the other participants for their comments
on my presentation.
1. On the meaning of essentialism, see KATHARINE T. BARTLETT & ANGELA HARRIS,
GENDER AND LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY 1007-1009 (2d ed. 1998); CRITICAL RACE
THEORY: THE CUTrING EDGE 281-343 (Richard Delgado, ed.1995); Angela P. Harris, Race and
Essentialsim in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 581 (1990).
2. Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color,
Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419 (1991).
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relevant to them. But the criticisms from and about other women made
me feel self-conscious about focusing on Black women.
Such comments were not distracting when they helped to further a
discussion about the commonalities and differences among the reproduc-
tive experiences of women of color. I appreciated, for example, the
Puerto-Riquefia who asked, "Do you know about 'la operaci6n,' the
government-supported campaign in Puerto Rico that resulted in the ster-
ilization of one-third of the women of childbearing age?"'3 In addition,
the Korean graduate students, who remarked, "What you are saying
about genetic relatedness and race in the United States reminds me of
the way Koreans define national identity," helped me understand how
the genetic tie "links individuals together while it preserves social
boundaries."4 Also, I learned more about the use of birth control to reg-
ulate women's bodies from a Native American woman who told me
about the coercive distribution of the long-acting contraceptive Norplant
on her reservation.
These women of color were trying to connect their experiences of
repressive reproductive health policies to what I was saying about poor
Black women's experiences. This sharing of distinct experiences, that
had common features, helped all of us to better understand the extent
and nature of reproductive regulation, to form coalitions, and to formu-
late strategies to oppose these policies.
Sometimes, however, the question, "What about other women of
color?," came from people who were bothered because I was focusing
exclusively on Black women. I viewed these comments as a diversion,
sometimes even a deliberate one. The question often stemmed from a
misunderstanding of the critique of essentialism in feminist scholarship.
Minority scholars have noted that white feminists' efforts to find com-
monalities among women often ended up erasing the identity and exper-
iences of women of color.5 Searching for a common oppression implied
not only a universal, essential gender identity common to all women, but
also that white, middle-class women have no racial and class identity.
As Elizabeth Spelman explained, this type of feminist thinking "invites
me to take what I understand to be true of me 'as a woman' for some
golden nugget of womanness all women have as women. How lovely:
the many turn out to be one, and the one that they are is me. '"6
Some feminists mistake this criticism of the exclusive focus on
3. See BETSY HARTMANN, REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND WRONGS: THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF
POPULATION CONTROL 247-48 (1995).
4. See Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 209, 211 & n. 7 (1995).
5. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 1.
6. ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST
THOUGHT 159 (1988).
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white women's experiences as a prohibition against ever paying exclu-
sive attention to the experiences of one group of women. But the prob-
lem of essentialism did not derive from studying the lives of particular
women; it derived from claiming that the lives of a particular group of
women represented all women.
Other commentators at my talks seemed to be implying that the
issue of poor Black women's autonomy by itself is not important enough
to be the center of discussion. I recognize a similar viewpoint in discus-
sions about the most effective strategy to challenge the prosecutions of
women for drug use during pregnancy.7 Most of the women prosecuted
for these crimes are poor Black women who smoked crack.8 These
women, however, make especially unsympathetic complainants because
of disparaging stereotypes about pregnant crack addicts and the histori-
cal devaluation of Black motherhood.9
Therefore, some attorneys and scholars have suggested ways of
diverting attention away from these women and the devaluing racial
images that degrade them by focusing instead on the dangers that puni-
tive policies pose for middle-class white women.' ° Although this
approach has certain strategic advantages, it implies that the repression
of poor Black women alone is not a persuasive enough basis for advo-
cating policy change.
Moreover, as I thought about the title of my article, I realized that it
made me more of an essentialist than if I had just been honest and stated
what the article was really about. The title suggests that the article
explores the reproductive rights of all women of color when it does not.
It might imply the erroneous claim that what I wrote about Black women
represents the experiences of other women of color as well. Writing
about Black people is not essentialist in and of itself. It only becomes
essentialist when the experiences discussed are taken to portray a uni-
form Black experience or a universal experience that applies to every
other group.
When I decided upon the title of my book about Black women's
reproductive liberty, I chose Killing the Black Body. I think that is a
more honest title. The book is about the Black body - the unique way
in which repressive reproductive policies have interpreted and attempted
to regulate Black bodies. I could not have adequately described these
policies without focusing on black-white relationships and on the partic-
7. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Unshackling Black Motherhood, 95 MICH. L. REV. 938, 954-59
(1997).
8. Id. at 938.
9. Id. at 954.
10. Id.
11. DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY (1997).
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ular meaning of blackness - what it means for bodies, as Anthony Far-
ley 2 put it, to be marked as black.
These repressive reproductive policies arose out of the history of
the enslavement of Africans in America. The institution of slavery gave
whites a unique economic and political interest in controlling Black
women's reproductive capacity.' 3 This form of subjugation made Black
women's wombs and the fetuses they carried chattel property. The pro-
cess of making a human being's very reproductive capacity the property
of someone else is not replicated in other relationships of power in the
United States. While slavery serves as a very powerful metaphor for
other reproductive practices, such as contract pregnancy or surrogacy,
Black women really were slaves.' 4 There is a distinction between a met-
aphor and the actual experience.
Further, the maternal images that justify these reproductive policies
are images that are uniquely Black: Jezebel, Mammy, matriarch, welfare
queen, and pregnant crack-addict. When I say these labels, a Black
woman almost certainly comes to mind. They do not apply to women of
any other race. Other groups of women have their own set of degrading
stereotypes that have helped to legitimize the regulation of their bodies
and reproductive decisions. The myths about Black motherhood support
particular reproductive policies- policies that cannot be explained
without investigating the implications of these images and the signifi-
cance of their blackness.
Does insisting on this focus on Black mothers reinforce the black-
white paradigm and its negative features? The answer depends on what
we mean by the black-white paradigm and what we see as its impact. I
do not believe that this focus necessarily reflects the essentialist aspects
of the black-white paradigm. The prominence of this paradigm in Criti-
cal Race Theory was criticized for excluding the experiences of people
who are neither Black nor white. Critical Race Theory must continue to
develop a more accurate and inclusive definition of race, racial identity,
and racial issues. But scholarship exploring Black women's reproduc-
tive experiences need not suggest that this is the exclusive word on
reproductive health policy.
My work in this area, however, has also made it very clear to me
that there continues to operate a hierarchy in the United States that is
based on white-black relationships with whites on top and Blacks on the
bottom. This hierarchy does not operate in every context; there are
12. See, Anthony Farley's piece in the Final Plenary of LatCrit II Conference.
13. See ROBERTS, supra note 11, at 22.
14. See Anita L. Allen, Surrogacy, Slavery, and the Ownership of Life, 13 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
POL'Y 139 (1990).
[Vol. 53:855
BLACKCRIT THEORY
some contexts, such as debates on immigration policy in some regions,
where native-born Blacks hold a privileged position relative to certain
immigrants of color. All Blacks and whites, moreover, are not similarly
situated within the white-black hierarchy. This hierarchy is complicated
by differences of class and gender. Nevertheless, the white-black hierar-
chy frequently governs discourse in the reproductive policy context.
This hierarchy is especially prominent in rhetoric and practice con-
cerning reproduction-assisting technologies-technologies such as in-
vitro fertilization ("IVF"), egg-donation, and artificial insemination.
These technologies are genetic marketing techniques; they allow parents
to purchase the genetic material of their children. They reveal that on
the American genetic market the genes of Black people are the least
valuable while the genes of whites are the most valuable. I believe that
the fertility business is so popular in the United States because it almost
exclusively produces white children.15
This valuation of children is replicated in the adoption market
where children are literally valued in dollars according to their racial
features. The vast majority of white adoptive parents are only willing to
take a white child. When they do adopt outside their race, whites gener-
ally prefer non-Black children with Asian or Latin American heritage
and are willing to pay more to adopt them.16 Latino children, for exam-
ple, are judged by some adoptive parents according to how "Black" or
"white" they look; the closer a child's features are to those associated
with white people, the more desirable the child is, while the closer a
child's features are to those associated with Black people, the less desir-
able the child is.17 Therefore, the lighter the skin, the blonder the hair,
the bluer the eyes, and the narrower the nose, the more valuable the
child is. The black-white paradigm in the adoption market for Latino
children operates alongside an European-Indian paradigm that values
children more highly the more European and the less Indian they look. ' 8
The black-white paradigm also helps to explain cases in which race
adds a disturbing dimension to the use of reproduction-assisting technol-
ogies. One case involved a white woman who brought a lawsuit against
a fertility clinic she claimed had mistakenly inseminated her with a
15. See Roberts, supra note 4, at 269-72.
16. See Zanita E. Fenton, In a World Not Their Own: The Adoption of Black Children, 10
HARV. BLACKLETI'ER J. 39, 51-54 (1993).
17. See Mary Jo McConahay, The Baby Trade: Where There Is Poverty in the Third World
and a Baby Shortage in the First, Children Become a Commodity, L. A. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1990, at
12; JANICE G. RAYMOND, WOMEN AS WOMBS: REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE BA'rrLE
OVER WOMEN'S FREEDOM 144-54 (1993).
18. I am grateful to Richard Delgado for his observation about the European-Indian paradigm
within the adoption market for Latino children.
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Black man's sperm instead of her husband's.19 The mother demanded
monetary damages for her injury, which she explained was caused by
the unbearable racial taunting her daughter suffered. Although receiving
the wrong sperm was an injury in itself, the damage of bearing a Black
child was linked to the opposition of Black and white genetic features.
This opposition was even more graphic in a bizarre fertility clinic
mix-up in the Netherlands. A woman who gave birth to twin boys as a
result of IVF realized when the babies were two months old that one was
white and one was Black."° The Dutch clinic mistakenly fertilized her
eggs with sperm from both her husband and a Black man.2' A News-
week article subtitled "A Fertility Clinic's Startling Error" reported that
"while one boy was as blond as his parents, the other's skin was darken-
ing and his brown hair was fuzzy."22 The reporters' wording evokes the
ominous sense that as the skin of the wrongfully conceived child turned
darker and darker and as his hair turned fuzzier and fuzzier, the horror of
the mistake increased.
The black-white paradigm is so powerful in the arena of reproduc-
tion that it sometimes erases other identities. In Johnson v. Calvert,23
Anna Johnson entered into a gestational surrogacy agreement with Cris-
pina and Mark Calvert, an infertile couple who wanted to have a geneti-
cally-related child.24 An embryo formed through IVF using Crispina
Calvert's eggs and Mark Calvert's sperm was implanted in Johnson,
who became pregnant and gave birth to a child. 25 The lawsuit arose
when Johnson notified the Calverts that she would refuse to relinquish
her parental rights to the child. 26 The case was complicated by the fact
that all of the parties were of different races: Anna Johnson is Black,
Crispina Calvert is Filipina, and Mark Calvert is white.27 The media,
however, paid far more attention to Johnson's race than to that of Cris-
pina Calvert. 28 As Lisa Ikemoto observed, "the media stories focused on
Anna Johnson's blackness and Mark Calvert's whiteness. 29 It also por-
19. See Robin Schatz, Sperm Bank Mix-up Claim; Woman Sues Doctor, Bank; Says Wrong
Deposit Used, NEWSDAY, March 9, 1990, at 5; Ronald Sullivan, Mother Accuses Sperm Bank of a
Mix-up, N. Y. TIMES, March 9, 1990, at B1.
20. See Dorinda Elliot & Friso Endt, Twins-with Two Fathers: The Netherlands: A Fertility
Clinic's Startling Error, NEWSWEEK, July 3, 1995, at 38.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
24. Id. at 778.
25. id.
26. Id.
27. See Lisa C. Ikemoto, The In/Fertile, the Too Fertile, and the Dysfertile, 47 HASTINGS L.J.
1007, 1023 (1996).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1023-24.
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trayed the baby as white.3' Thus, the case was publicized as a dispute
over whether a Black surrogate mother had any legal claim to a white
child. (The California Supreme Court held that Johnson was not the
legal mother of the child.) 31
Examining the white-black paradigm in the context of reproductive
technologies also illuminates the project of defining racial identity in
non-biological terms. I have argued that race influences the importance
that many whites place on new reproductive technology's central aim-
the reproduction of genetically related children.3" The critical impor-
tance of racial purity to white domination helped to create the concep-
tion of identity rooted in genetic heritage. This claim forced me to ask
the question, how important is genetic relatedness to Black people's
self-definition? Do Blacks not place equal weight on genetics in their
own identity and the meaning of blackness?
Of course, it is important to most Black people to have genetically-
related children. We, too, determine whether someone is Black, at least
as an initial matter, by their physical features. But I think that Black
identity is tied less to biology than we typically acknowledge. Black
people have also resisted identifying themselves strictly in biological
terms. Instead, Blacks have re-defined themselves as a political group.
It is not true that Blacks are born with an essential racial identity based
entirely on their physical attributes or genetic make-up. Identifying as
Black does not mean simply assuming an oppressive straight jacket con-
structed by whites.
Black people have more options for self-identification than one
might think. For example, you might look at me and say, "Of course,
she has no choice in her identity: she is a Black or African American
woman." What alternatives do I have for fluidity, for shifting identities,
or for choice? But the truth is that I am the first Black person in my
family born in the United States. I see it as a political decision that I
made in my teens to identify with Black people whose ancestors were
enslaved in the southern United States. As far as I know, I have no
ancestors who were slaves in the South. Yet that is how I usually think
about myself and present myself to others. I also deliberately decided at
an early age not to identify as biracial or multi-racial although I am
biologically qualified to do so. That, too, is a political judgment.
Sometimes I identify as the daughter of a Jamaican immigrant to
the United States. In fact, I identified myself as a Jamaican at the Lat-
Crit II conference when several participants discovered that most of the
30. Id.
31. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 778 & 787 (Cal. 1993).
32. See Roberts, supra note 4, at 223-30.
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Black people there were of West Indian descent. At one point, we gath-
ered to share stories about our common backgrounds. When I debated
Peter Brimelow, the author of Alien Nation, at a conference on immigra-
tion, I asserted my identity as the daughter of a dark-skinned immigrant
- someone Brimelow argued should have no right to automatic United
States citizenship.33 I passed as a Latina when I lived for a year in
Bogotd with a Colombian family and wanted to immerse myself in the
culture there as well as to escape the prevalent anti-American sentiment.
Again, all of these shifts in self-definition were political moves.
As these examples show, Blacks are not consigned to a super-
imposed, pre-ordained, uniform, universal, biological identity. We have
fluid identities that shift according to the context and that are, at least in
part, political and deliberately chosen. We should think more about a
BlackCrit Theory that develops a notion of a Black identity that is not
rooted in biology or genetics. We know that a theory that posits an
essential Black identity and that excludes the experiences of other peo-
ple of color is false and dangerous. But we must also be careful not to
advocate the kind of anti-essentialism that is a way of disassociating
with blackness. We should be concerned about avoiding blackness when
so many people still feel uneasy about "loving blackness."34
33. See PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION (1995). I argued that the campaign to deny
immigrants of color the right to give birth to citizens perpetuates the racist ideal of a white
American identity in Dorothy E. Roberts, Who May Give Birth to Citizens?: Reproduction,
Eugenics, and Immigration, in IMMIGRANTS OUT!: THE NEW NA1IVISM AND THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT
IMPULSE IN THE UNITED STATES 205 (Juan F. Perea ed., 1997).
34. Bell Hooks, BLACK LOOKS: RACE AND REPRESENTATION 9 (1992).
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